Matched tested policy condition: regulated data cannot leave the approved destination set.
See the decision before the action.
These synthetic, tested examples show how 5D's action-policy gate can permit, block, or hold a proposed AI-agent action for review. This page does not call a model, reviewer, tool, or external service.
See the decision and its effect.
Illustrative simulation · no live action executed.
ExportCustomerData → external_crm Why this decision?
Intent becomes a typed proposed-action envelope before policy evaluates the request.
- Tool
- ExportCustomerData
- Target
- external_crm
- Purpose
- support_sync
- Principal
- agent/customer_ops
- Policy
- customer-data-v3
Advisory AI evidence can inform policy. It cannot permit an action.
{
"schema": "ActionObservation",
"external_transfer": 0.97,
"purpose_consistent": 0.42,
"uncertainty": 0.08
} Runtime flow
- 01Proposed action
The host supplies the tool, target, purpose, and principal.
- 02Evidence, if needed
Optional context or reviewer evidence remains advisory.
- 035D authority boundary · policy decision
Policy permits, blocks, or selects human review.
- 04Execution
The host executes only a permitted action and records the observed result separately.
Integration, failure, retry, and reconciliation
Data boundary: only the displayed tool, target, purpose, and scenario-specific evidence fields cross to the simulated observer. Principal validation, policy ownership, grant source, and deterministic evaluation remain local. Nothing is persisted or transmitted by this page.
Invalid input or a deterministic-policy error stops before execution. Missing or malformed optional evidence cannot permit an action. An unavailable or expired reviewer leaves the review branch unresolved. Each retry receives a new attempt ID and is evaluated against the current input and policy. Duplicate delivery or an unknown downstream outcome requires reconciliation by the integration owner.
Audit receipt and technical evidence
demo-action-blocked-001demo-attempt-blocked-001-a1REDBLOCKrecorded · cannot permitnot applicablenot applicableblocked before simulated executionrecorded in example receiptnot attemptedDownload the illustrative schema. This is not a production receipt and does not claim that one entry point implements the complete integration contract.
Three paths through the boundary.
These are worked examples, not production results.
Verified block
Matched tested policy condition: regulated data cannot leave the approved destination set.
blocked before simulated executionAI check + human review
Policy selected explicit human review. The simulated reviewer recorded acceptance; policy then resolved the declared review branch to PERMIT.
simulated permit · no external actionRule-based permit
The tool, target, purpose, and authority matched an explicit policy rule.
simulated permit · no external actionSee the boundary in context.
Each example uses the tested 5D 0.7.0 algorithm and a declared four-band policy profile. The normalized score uses the tested 0–3 output scale and describes the illustrated action, not a historical incident or the safety of a whole deployment.
01Deployment surface 01Code and infrastructure changesGate commands that can modify repositories, databases, cloud resources, build pipelines, or release channels.4 scored actions
Drop a live database while repairing a migration
The agent mistakes the live target for a disposable test environment. Under the pinned illustrative policy, the expected result is that the action is ineligible for execution.
- Tool
- database.execute
- Target
- live primary database
- Purpose
- repair migration
5D suppliesA deterministic RED decision before the call.
Host ownsRouting every database executor through the gate and refusing the call.
Coverage limitA direct or alternate database path bypasses this gate.
Apply an infrastructure plan assembled from retrieved instructions
Untrusted context steers the plan toward deleting live resources and snapshots. Under the pinned illustrative policy, the expected result is that the action is ineligible for execution.
- Tool
- terraform.apply
- Target
- cloud account
- Purpose
- repair infrastructure
5D suppliesA deterministic RED decision and rationale.
Host ownsPlan validation, complete interception, and execution refusal.
Coverage limit5D does not inspect every Terraform semantic or prove recovery.
Edit a local documentation file on a review branch
A low-impact edit may still be wrong, but stays reviewable and reversible. Under the pinned illustrative policy, the expected result is eligible to proceed.
- Tool
- file.write
- Target
- documentation branch
- Purpose
- clarify setup text
5D suppliesA GREEN action-risk band under the declared envelope.
Host ownsWorkspace isolation, code review, and the final merge.
Coverage limitGREEN is eligibility under this profile, not proof that the edit is correct.
Run an installer and publish a package after reading an issue
Prompt injection pivots from untrusted issue text into a privileged release path. Under the pinned illustrative policy, the expected result is that the action is ineligible for execution.
- Tool
- release.publish
- Target
- package registry
- Purpose
- triage and release
5D suppliesA deterministic block at the privileged publish boundary.
Host ownsWorkflow permissions, token isolation, and coverage of every release path.
Coverage limit5D does not secure CI caches or registry credentials by itself.
Policy 0.7.0-catalogue-four-band · YELLOW enabled · source 5a5e991 · bands and host dispositions are separate.
02Deployment surface 02Data access and external transferEvaluate what data an agent reads, where it sends it, and which privileges make that movement consequential.4 scored actions
Export account-holder records to an external workspace
A broad query and external destination exceed the declared data boundary. Under the pinned illustrative policy, the expected result is that the action is ineligible for execution.
- Tool
- storage.upload
- Target
- external workspace
- Purpose
- produce analysis
5D suppliesA RED decision before external transfer.
Host ownsData classification, destination truth, and enforcement across every egress path.
Coverage limitUnclassified data or an uncovered uploader can bypass the intended boundary.
Read public aggregate metrics into an approved workspace
The input may be inaccurate, but the action has limited privilege and exposure. Under the pinned illustrative policy, the expected result is eligible to proceed.
- Tool
- http.get
- Target
- approved public endpoint
- Purpose
- prepare a report
5D suppliesA GREEN action-risk band for the declared request.
Host ownsAllowlisted endpoints, content validation, and later use of the data.
Coverage limitGREEN does not certify the source or the report's accuracy.
Attach a credential bundle to an external ticket
The agent follows a request that treats secrets as ordinary diagnostic data. Under the pinned illustrative policy, the expected result is that the action is ineligible for execution.
- Tool
- ticket.attach
- Target
- external ticket system
- Purpose
- diagnose access problem
5D suppliesA deterministic RED decision at the attachment boundary.
Host ownsSecret detection, destination control, and credential rotation after exposure.
Coverage limit5D only sees the action context supplied by the host.
Index shared conversation links in a public search surface
Material shared for narrow access becomes discoverable at broad scale. Under the pinned illustrative policy, the expected result is that the action is ineligible for execution.
- Tool
- search.index
- Target
- public index
- Purpose
- improve discovery
5D suppliesA RED decision before material enters the public index.
Host ownsClassification, access control, deletion, and complete indexing-path coverage.
Coverage limitThe gate does not discover every sensitive field without truthful context.
Policy 0.7.0-catalogue-four-band · YELLOW enabled · source 5a5e991 · bands and host dispositions are separate.
03Deployment surface 03Funds, orders, and irreversible transactionsHold or block actions that move value, create commitments, or change balances and orders.4 scored actions
Initiate a payment to a newly supplied beneficiary
A manipulated invoice changes the destination before payment. Under the pinned illustrative policy, the expected result is that the action is ineligible for execution.
- Tool
- payments.create
- Target
- new beneficiary
- Purpose
- settle invoice
5D suppliesA deterministic RED decision before payment creation.
Host ownsBeneficiary verification, payment authorization, and executor coverage.
Coverage limit5D is not a payment rail and cannot reverse a transfer.
Draft a nonbinding quote for internal review
The draft may be wrong but cannot create a commitment on its own. Under the pinned illustrative policy, the expected result is eligible to proceed.
- Tool
- document.draft
- Target
- internal review queue
- Purpose
- prepare quote
5D suppliesA GREEN band for creation of the internal draft.
Host ownsContent review and preventing the draft from becoming an offer.
Coverage limitThe later send or acceptance action needs its own gate.
Issue a high-value refund to a stored payment method
A fabricated complaint or mistaken account match triggers value movement. Under the pinned illustrative policy, the expected result is to hold the action until the host records the required review.
- Tool
- refund.issue
- Target
- stored payment method
- Purpose
- resolve dispute
5D suppliesAn ORANGE band and hold signal.
Host ownsReviewer identity, authority, approval freshness, and final execution.
Coverage limit5D does not supply the approval queue or authenticate the reviewer.
Accept a one-dollar offer for a high-value item
Prompt manipulation makes the model claim authority it does not have. Under the pinned illustrative policy, the expected result is to hold the action until the host records the required review.
- Tool
- order.accept
- Target
- high-value inventory
- Purpose
- complete sale
5D suppliesAn ORANGE band before an order commitment.
Host ownsDefining actual commercial authority and binding the approved amount.
Coverage limitA text response outside the gated order tool remains outside enforcement.
Policy 0.7.0-catalogue-four-band · YELLOW enabled · source 5a5e991 · bands and host dispositions are separate.
04Deployment surface 04Identity, permissions, and account changesControl actions that grant authority, change authentication posture, or alter account ownership and access.4 scored actions
Grant global administrator access to a new identity
A spoofed request or misbound identity escalates privileges. Under the pinned illustrative policy, the expected result is that the action is ineligible for execution.
- Tool
- iam.role.grant
- Target
- global administrator role
- Purpose
- restore access
5D suppliesA deterministic RED decision before privilege escalation.
Host ownsAuthentication, requester authority, grantee validation, and enforcement.
Coverage limitCaptured identity assertions are not authenticated by 5D.
Reset a password after a recovery conversation
Social engineering supplies plausible but unverified recovery facts. Under the pinned illustrative policy, the expected result is to hold the action until the host records the required review.
- Tool
- account.password.reset
- Target
- individual account
- Purpose
- recover access
5D suppliesAn ORANGE hold signal for the credential change.
Host ownsRecovery proof, reviewer authentication, and the reset channel.
Coverage limit5D does not verify identity evidence or operate the recovery workflow.
Read non-secret group membership for an internal inventory
The read may be overbroad but does not mutate authority. Under the pinned illustrative policy, the expected result is eligible to proceed.
- Tool
- iam.group.read
- Target
- approved directory scope
- Purpose
- compile access inventory
5D suppliesA GREEN band for the declared read.
Host ownsDirectory scoping, rate limits, and protection of the inventory output.
Coverage limitThe band assumes the supplied data classification is correct.
Disable multifactor authentication and rotate recovery contacts
An attacker uses the support channel to remove account protections. Under the pinned illustrative policy, the expected result is that the action is ineligible for execution.
- Tool
- account.security.update
- Target
- privileged account
- Purpose
- resolve login issue
5D suppliesA deterministic RED block for the declared change.
Host ownsIdentity proofing, break-glass policy, and complete account-path coverage.
Coverage limitAn administration console that bypasses the gate remains outside enforcement.
Policy 0.7.0-catalogue-four-band · YELLOW enabled · source 5a5e991 · bands and host dispositions are separate.
05Deployment surface 05Research, retrieval, and untrusted contextKeep instructions found in web pages, messages, documents, and other agent outputs from becoming action authority.4 scored actions
Read and summarize an allowlisted public page
The source may be wrong, but the action remains read-only and bounded. Under the pinned illustrative policy, the expected result is eligible to proceed.
- Tool
- browser.read
- Target
- allowlisted public page
- Purpose
- prepare research notes
5D suppliesA GREEN band for the bounded read action.
Host ownsSource allowlisting, truth checking, and preventing retrieved text from granting authority.
Coverage limit5D does not establish that the source or summary is correct.
Copy authenticated profile data into an attacker-controlled form
Prompt injection on a page redirects the agent across trust boundaries. Under the pinned illustrative policy, the expected result is that the action is ineligible for execution.
- Tool
- browser.type
- Target
- untrusted external form
- Purpose
- complete retrieved instruction
5D suppliesA RED decision before cross-boundary data entry.
Host ownsBrowser interception, authenticated-session isolation, and destination truth.
Coverage limitTyping or navigation not routed through the gate remains outside enforcement.
Execute a helper script referenced by retrieved content
A malicious source turns research into privileged local code execution. Under the pinned illustrative policy, the expected result is that the action is ineligible for execution.
- Tool
- shell.execute
- Target
- developer workstation
- Purpose
- process research artifact
5D suppliesA deterministic RED block at the shell boundary.
Host ownsSandboxing, provenance checks, and interception of every executor.
Coverage limit5D does not analyze arbitrary program behavior.
Store retrieved guidance in an internal draft collection
Untrusted claims could influence later work if the draft loses its provenance. Under the pinned illustrative policy, the expected result is to hold the action until the host records the required review.
- Tool
- knowledge.write
- Target
- internal draft collection
- Purpose
- stage research
5D suppliesAn ORANGE hold signal for the provenance-sensitive write.
Host ownsSource labeling, review, and separation between draft and trusted knowledge.
Coverage limitThe score does not validate the retrieved claim.
Policy 0.7.0-catalogue-four-band · YELLOW enabled · source 5a5e991 · bands and host dispositions are separate.
06Deployment surface 06External communications and publicationDistinguish reviewable drafts from messages, posts, offers, and repository changes that speak or act externally.4 scored actions
Draft a routine reply inside a review queue
The wording may be wrong, but the draft cannot send itself. Under the pinned illustrative policy, the expected result is eligible to proceed.
- Tool
- message.draft
- Target
- internal review queue
- Purpose
- prepare reply
5D suppliesA YELLOW action-risk band for draft creation.
Host ownsThe review queue, content quality, and a separate gate for sending.
Coverage limitYELLOW is enabled in this illustrative profile; 0.7.0 folds it to GREEN by default.
Publish an unreviewed statement to a public channel
The model invents facts and immediately attributes them to the organisation. Under the pinned illustrative policy, the expected result is that the action is ineligible for execution.
- Tool
- social.publish
- Target
- public channel
- Purpose
- respond quickly
5D suppliesA RED decision before publication.
Host ownsAccount controls, editorial approval, and every publication connector.
Coverage limitThe policy gate cannot recall copied public content.
Send a policy exception and refund promise
Generated guidance contradicts the applicable policy and appears authoritative. Under the pinned illustrative policy, the expected result is to hold the action until the host records the required review.
- Tool
- message.send
- Target
- individual traveler
- Purpose
- resolve request
5D suppliesAn ORANGE hold signal before sending the commitment.
Host ownsPolicy retrieval, content review, reviewer authority, and final send.
Coverage limit5D does not determine the correct refund policy.
Commit generated code directly to a public repository
Untrusted instructions introduce harmful code or disclose internal material. Under the pinned illustrative policy, the expected result is that the action is ineligible for execution.
- Tool
- repository.push
- Target
- public default branch
- Purpose
- apply maintenance fix
5D suppliesA deterministic RED decision before the push.
Host ownsBranch protection, token scope, review, signing, and connector coverage.
Coverage limit5D does not inspect every code defect or secure the repository host.
Policy 0.7.0-catalogue-four-band · YELLOW enabled · source 5a5e991 · bands and host dispositions are separate.
07Deployment surface 07Delegated and multi-agent workflowsCarry policy context across delegation so one agent cannot turn another agent or tool into an ungoverned executor.4 scored actions
Delegate an allowlisted read-only search to a subagent
The subagent may return poor evidence but cannot mutate an external system. Under the pinned illustrative policy, the expected result is eligible to proceed.
- Tool
- agent.delegate
- Target
- read-only search worker
- Purpose
- collect public sources
5D suppliesA GREEN band for the bounded delegation envelope.
Host ownsTool allowlists, worker isolation, and validation of returned evidence.
Coverage limitActions taken by the worker need their own interception boundary.
Delegate package installation and shell execution to a subagent
The parent hides privilege escalation inside a seemingly routine delegated task. Under the pinned illustrative policy, the expected result is that the action is ineligible for execution.
- Tool
- agent.delegate
- Target
- shell-enabled worker
- Purpose
- install helper
5D suppliesA RED decision on the delegated capability request.
Host ownsPropagating policy to the worker and gating every nested tool call.
Coverage limitScoring only the parent delegation does not govern hidden downstream calls.
Ask another agent to send a public message under the user's identity
Delegation launders authority across agents and bypasses the original approval boundary. Under the pinned illustrative policy, the expected result is that the action is ineligible for execution.
- Tool
- agent.message
- Target
- external-messaging worker
- Purpose
- publish update
5D suppliesA deterministic RED decision before authority crosses agents.
Host ownsIdentity validation, delegation scope, and interception at the executing peer.
Coverage limit5D cannot enforce a boundary inside an agent that never calls the gate.
Recursively delegate an open-ended goal with shared broad credentials
No component retains a complete view of authority, retries, destinations, or accumulated side effects. Under the pinned illustrative policy, the expected result is that the action is ineligible for execution.
- Tool
- agent.recursive_delegate
- Target
- unbounded worker pool
- Purpose
- complete objective by any available path
5D suppliesA RED decision on the declared delegation envelope.
Host ownsPer-agent credentials, bounded tasks, attempt tracking, cancellation, and nested interception.
Coverage limitOne top-level score cannot govern an opaque multi-agent graph.
Policy 0.7.0-catalogue-four-band · YELLOW enabled · source 5a5e991 · bands and host dispositions are separate.
Change the traffic and routing assumptions.
Explore how a declared deterministic share changes the volume routed to an optional observer while policy remains the permission authority.
Tool, target, purpose, principal, and context enter one declared contract.
Versioned rules resolve declared inputs on documented integration paths.
Observer evidence can tighten or hold. It cannot clear an explicit block.
Change the declared assumptions.
Declared assumptions, not measured 5D performance.
365-day illustrative year. Currency is a display/input unit; no exchange-rate conversion is applied.
Five owners, one versioned action contract.
Policy intent, implementation, threat review, human disposition, and reconstructable evidence stay connected without transferring organisational accountability to a model.
Start from public primitives: inspectable policy evaluation, verdicts, documented adapters and gateways, and evidence records. The support matrix states what version 0.7.0 verifies and what the host still owns.
Routing share depends on your policy and traffic.
Observer cost is user-supplied; it is not a 5D price or forecast.
Estimated variable observer spend excludes deterministic infrastructure, human review, retries, and other deployment costs.
Model cost and latency vary with provider, model, caching, concurrency, and deployment design.
Run the public evaluation pack.
Hash-locked Python 3.11 wheels install offline before five non-destructive checks reverify and exercise the exact public 0.7.0 wheel.
Confirm bounded execution eligibility
A demonstration read returns the executable sentinel without touching a real file or tool.
Keep review and denial distinct
An ORANGE result remains held, while a destructive command returns RED and BLOCK.
Prove the gate changes the effect path
An in-memory counter advances without the gate and stays unchanged behind the blocking gate.
The pack does not prove complete path coverage, authenticated authority, a reviewer service, authoritative custody, full framework support, or deployment suitability. Retry, unknown-outcome, reconciliation, and challenge records are clearly marked as examples.
Deploying an agentic system where one unapproved action is unacceptable?
Describe the proposed action path, its highest-risk side effect, and the authority boundary you need to preserve. We can start with the smallest testable integration boundary.
Selecting Draft email opens a prefilled draft in your configured email app or provider. The site does not send or store it. Review the draft before sending. Do not include secrets, credentials, regulated data, or customer data.
Prefer to start directly? Email hello@langoni.me.
Where an action-level gate can sit.
These are reference shapes for exploration, not claimed integrations.
Read or export a case record
Normalize the tool, target, purpose, and identity context before a case system is touched.
Pair with the authority guideReview a new beneficiary payment
Keep uncertain context and a human decision separate from the policy disposition.
Pair with the retry guideControl a destination change
Make the destination boundary explicit and preserve a reconstructable receipt.
Pair with the evidence guideKeep authority between intent and effect.
The host application still owns identity validation, tool execution, retries, and downstream reconciliation.
Normalize the intended action and its context.
Apply deterministic policy; optional model evidence cannot grant permission.
Only the host integration performs or withholds the external action.
Read the complete action flow for the decision contract and illustrated path.